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“THE CRISIS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW” 
Hon. Richard Goldstone 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL SCHARF:  Good afternoon, everybody. 
Wow! We have quite a crowd in here. Hopefully, we are not violating the 
fire marshal’s law. I know the overflow room is also full. Welcome back to 
our conference, “International Law in Crisis.”  
It is my extreme pleasure to introduce to you today’s luncheon 
speaker. Many of you came to this conference because you were interested 
in what he has to say. We have a record crowd at this conference.  
We had 190 preregistered people, which is way more than we usu-
ally get, and we also have probably about a thousand people watching us 
live and another 10,000 will watch it in archive.  
Let me start by telling you about Richard Goldstone’s career and 
then about his special relationship with this institution as part of my intro-
duction.  
Richard Goldstone was a pioneer in fighting Apartheid and the 
Goldstone Commission1 the first commission that bears his name was one 
of the most important institutions that helped dismantle Apartheid in South 
Africa.  
When the Yugoslavia tribunal was formed and I was working at the 
State Department as Attorney Adviser for U.N. Affairs they were struggling 
to find somebody that could be acceptable to the whole international com-
munity, to be the first prosecutor of an international tribunal since Nurem-
berg.  
It took them fourteen months and dozens of candidates before they 
all settled on a consensus on Justice Richard Goldstone. 
At the time, Richard had just been appointed to the Constitutional 
Court.2 It was like our Supreme Court, and so he had to ask for a leave of 
  
  Richard Goldstone is a former Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. He 
also served as chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda. 
 1 See generally Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidating (Goldstone Commission), HUMAN RTS. INST. S. AFR., http://www.hurisa.org.za/ 
gold.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (providing information on how the Goldstone Commis-
sion was formed and its investigations during Apartheid). 
 2 Judges: Judge Richard Goldstone, CONST. COURT S. AFR., http://www.constitutional 
court.org.za/site/judges/justicerichardgoldstone/index1.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (not-
ing that Goldstone served as a judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa from July 
1994 through October 2003).  
File: Goldstone 2 Created on:  4/3/2012 1:08:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:27:00 PM 
14 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:13 
absence, which Nelson Mandela gladly gave him. I am sure there were 
some tough negotiations, but it was similar to when Robert Jackson took a 
leave of absence from our Supreme Court to be the first prosecutor of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal.3 
When Richard created the Yugoslavia tribunal, and I used that word 
intentionally because he was the founding father, he was the one who took a 
tribunal that most people thought was just put together as a Band-Aid or just 
some kind of propaganda tool to show the West was doing something when 
it refused to put ground forces or air forces to stop the atrocities in Bosnia.  
Nobody really thought it was going to succeed. Nobody thought 
that the top ten people that Eagleberger had identified as the worst culprits 
would ever see justice.4 And yet, over the years, especially because of the 
dint of Richard Goldstone’s personality and his politics and his fundraising 
and everything he did to create this little institution and turn it into a huge 
tribunal that dwarfed Nuremberg, they got Milošević, the leader of Serbia.5 
They got Mladić, the main general.6 They got Karadžić.7  
In fact, of all the indictees, every single one has now been arrested 
and brought to justice in The Hague.8 Nobody would have thought that 
would happen, and that’s because of Richard Goldstone.  
Now, when Richard left the tribunal back on the Constitutional 
Court, he took on a series of other important work. He worked on the issue 
of Kosovo’s status, and he worked, of course, as the dean mentioned this 
morning, on the very controversial Goldstone Commission report.9 
  
 3 See generally John Q. Barrett, The Nuremberg Roles of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 6 
WASH U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 511 (2007) (discussing how Justice Jackson was uniquely 
suited to be a prosecutor in the Nuremberg Tribunal).  
 4 See LEILA NADYA SADAT & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI 275 (2008) 
(“The list of persons named by Eagleburger included Slobodan Milosevic, President of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); Radovan Karadzic, leader of the 
self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and General Ratko Mladic, 
commander of the Bosnian Serbs military forces.”). 
 5 Milosevic Charged with Bosnia Genocide, BBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2011), http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/europe/1672414.stm.  
 6 Dan Bilefsky & Doreen Carvajal, Serb Ex-General Accused of Massacre is Captured, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2011, at A1.  
 7 Editorial, Trying Karadzic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, at A30 (noting that it took thir-
teen years and “enormous” international pressure for Serbian officials to arrest Karadzic).  
 8 Milosevic Charged with Bosnia Genocide, supra note 5; Serbia Extradites Ratko Mladic 
to the Hague, BBC NEWS (May 31, 2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe136079 
80; Trying Karadzic, supra note 7. 
 9 See generally United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, U.N. HUMAN 
RTS. COUNCIL, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/factfinding 
mission.htm (providing the text of the Goldstone Report, methodology information, and 
webcasts of the public hearings).  
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For the law school, however, he had played also a very special role. 
I met Richard 19 years ago at a conference in Syracuse, Sicily, and we es-
tablished what became a very active academic consortium—that is based 
and headquartered here at Case Western Reserve—where we do work for all 
of the international tribunals.10  
We started working for the Yugoslavia tribunal when it expanded to 
the Rwanda Tribunal.11 We also expanded when David Crane12 became the 
chief prosecutor for the special court of Sierra Leone.13 Richard suggested 
you might want to have Professor Scharf and his students help you out as 
well. So we took on that; same thing with Cambodian Tribunal and the Spe-
cial Tribunal for Lebanon.  
In addition, one of our favorite alumni—who is profiled in the up-
coming “In Brief,” which is our alumni magazine—Chris Rassi, started his 
career as Justice Goldstone’s law clerk at the Constitutional Court in South 
Africa14 as did an alumni or as did both an alumni and a colleague who is 
now down at Cleveland State, who also has invited Richard to speak there 
this afternoon. And he will be, after he leaves here, Cleveland gets a double 
dose of Richard. 
Now, from the tribunal work we did, we ultimately, together with 
the Public International Law and Policy Group, our program doing this 
work for tribunals, were nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize,15 and it has 
brought a lot of good attention to the work we do. It also has really helped 
build up this program.  
Now, over the years, Richard has come, no matter how busy he 
was, and spoken at our conferences. He has been a Klatsky endowed lectur-
  
 10 See generally Frederick K. Cox International Law Center: Special Student Opportuni-
ties, CASE W. RES. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/content.asp?content_ 
id=29 (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (describing international tribunal externships available to 
students).  
 11 See generally General Information, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr. 
org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (de-
scribing what the Rwanda Tribunal is and why it was created).  
 12 See generally Profile: David M. Crane, SYRACUSE UNIV. COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www. 
law.syr.edu/deans-faculty-staff/profile.asp?fac=152 (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (providing a 
summary of David Crane’s professional accomplishments). 
 13 See id. (noting that Crane served as the founding chief prosecutor of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone).   
 14 See Christopher Rassi Joins the Washington Office, THOMPSON HINE LLP, http://www. 
thompsonhine.com/publications/publication1204.html#3181 (last modified Sept. 14, 2007) 
(“Mr. Rassi served as law clerk to the Honorable Yvonne Makgoro, Constitutional Court of 
South Africa.”) 
 15 Michael Scharf ’88 Nominated for Nobel Peace Prize, DUKE L. NEWS & EVENTS, http:// 
www.law.duke.edu/features/2005/scharf.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).  
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er, which is a human rights lecture.16 He has spoken at major conferences 
we have had. Three years ago, maybe it is four now, he was selected to get 
the honorary degree from this university. So he is an alumnus of this univer-
sity, and we are proud of him, no matter how controversial some people 
think his report is.  
I will say this: as the dean suggested, we love controversy here be-
cause that’s what an academic institution does, so last year we had a pro-
gram that, unfortunately, Richard was not able to come to, where we debat-
ed for hours the Goldstone Commission report, and several of the panelists 
here have written articles, and these are available still, available out in the 
hall.  
If you want to see the dissection of every dotted ‘I’ and crossed ‘T’ 
and everything in the Goldstone Commission report, we did that. So we 
don’t shy away from critique here. But we didn’t invite him today to talk 
about the Goldstone report.  
Lots of stuff is going on in the world about international law and 
crisis. We have Gadhafi on the run.17 We have got al-Bashir, who has been 
indicted by the ICC.18 We have lots of major international criminals that 
need to be brought to justice.  
And there is nobody in the world who knows that topic better than 
Richard Goldstone. We asked him to come here and talk about that. So his 
speech today will be about that. He would like his questions and answers to 
be on that subject.  
After this, there is going to be another panel about the Middle East-
ern crisis, and if we want to go back to talking about the Goldstone report, 
we can do that on that panel, but for this panel, we are focusing on this ex-
pertise that Richard Goldstone brings that nobody else really has in the 
world, and we are so happy to have him here.  
Please join me in welcoming him. 
[Applause.] 
HON. RICHARD GOLDSTONE:  Well, Michael, thank you very 
much for your very warm introduction. It is a great pleasure and privilege to 
be back at Case Western. I have made a number of visits here and spoken at 
similar seminars and other functions to which Michael has referred I would 
add that I have had a very warm relationship with Michael for almost two 
  
 16 See Frederick K. Cox International Law Center: About the Center, CASE W. RES. UNIV. 
SCH. OF LAW, http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/content.asp?content_id=26 (last visited Jan. 19, 
2012) (listing Goldstone as a Klatsky Endowed Seminar in Human Rights lecturer).  
 17 Kareem Fahim, Anthony Shadid, & Rick Gladstone, Qaddafi, Seized by Foes, Meets a 
Violent End, N.Y. TIMES, October 21, 2011, at A1.  
 18 See ICC Indictment of Sudanese Leader, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
7924195.stm (Mar. 4, 2009) (quoting excerpts from the arrest warrant of Sudanese President 
Omar al-Bashir).   
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decades in which we have worked together in many areas of international 
humanitarian law.  
I hope too many of you won’t be disappointed that I am not going 
to talk about fact finding missions. I don’t believe that they are directly rel-
evant to the issue of whether international law is in crisis.  
Let me say only this: the view I have just expressed is based on the 
fact that fact finding missions are not judicial; they are not quasi-judicial; 
they don’t make the law.19 They provide or may not provide, as the case 
may be, factual background and possibly even legal views, which are not 
binding on anybody, but may or may not be useful to political bodies or to 
legal bodies out there.20 
We heard an excellent introduction to this conference yesterday 
evening, of all places at the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame. I must say I didn’t 
envy David Crane talking in that atmosphere, but he overcame problems 
that I would have thought were impossible to overcome, and it was a very 
sober, somewhat pessimistic introduction to the topic.  
He was wise to set that tone for a conference that is on “The Crisis 
of International Law.” I am more optimistic. I don’t believe I am a starry-
eyed optimist, but I am an optimist, and that optimism has led me to decide 
to talk not about the crisis of international law, but rather the crisis in the 
implementation of international law. 
I imagine that all of you, like me, were frustrated at not being able 
to attend all of today's panels because they have all been excellent and war-
rant congratulations to Michael and his colleagues on the organization of yet 
another outstanding conference with a gathering of outstanding people who 
are so well qualified to talk to the various topics that we have been feasting 
on today. 
International law—far from being in crisis, is being relied upon and 
called in aid more frequently by international leaders than ever before.21 The 
current relevance of international law could never have been anticipated but 
a few years ago.  
  
 19 See generally The United Nations Human Rights System, HUMAN RTS. EDUC. ASSOC, 
http://www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=437 (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (explaining the pro-
cedures and practices of fact-finding missions).  
 20 Id. 
 21 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law, U.S. DEPT. 
STATE (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (“[O]beying 
our international commitments is both right and smart, and that is a message that this Admin-
istration, and I as a Legal Adviser, are committed to spreading.”); see also Merkel Demands 
Respect for International Law, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 11, 2006), http://www.spiegel.de/ 
international/0,1518,436359,00.html (quoting Chancellor Angela Merkel: “Apart from de-
termination and international unity, respect for international law, tolerance and respect for 
other cultures should be the maxims of our actions.”).  
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The question, as I have already indicated, that we have to ask our-
selves, is whether international law can fulfill the expectations of those rely-
ing upon it. Let me say, too, by word of warning, that too many people 
place too much of a load on the law. The law is but one tool, and in many 
respects an insignificant tool in the development of peace and security and 
economic sustainability. The law is a tool in that regard, but without the 
political will, without the necessary economic resources, it cannot be a mag-
ic wand that is going to cure the most serious problems that the world com-
munity is facing. 
Allow me do two things: First, to point out the huge developments 
in various areas of international law; and second, when I have done that, to 
talk about its implementation.  
And let me start with the area that I know best and to which Mi-
chael has referred, and that is international criminal law and, in particular, 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). When the International Criminal 
Court was agreed to in Rome in the middle of 1998, there was this huge 
threshold of sixty ratifications before the Court could begin to operate.22 
This was seen by the majority of optimistic people as a huge threshold that 
would take at least a decade to reach.  
But, as we know, it took less than four years, and amazingly, today 
117 of the 193 members of the United Nations have ratified the Rome Trea-
ty.23 
It is interesting looking at the 117 nations by year and region:24 Af-
rica thirty-two;25 Latin America and the Caribbean twenty-six;26 Asia and 
the Pacific Guard, sixteen,27 and Europe and the CIS countries forty-three.28 
It is a huge, huge development, and it includes the 43 from Europe, includ-
ing every member of the European Union.29 
It is possible that the so-called Arab Spring might bring more Arab 
countries into the ICC fold, and there has been an unfortunate shortage of 
  
 22 Ratification of the Rome Statute, COAL. INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/? 
mod=romeratification (last visited Jan. 19, 2012). 
 23 The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icccpi.int 
/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2012). 
 24 Ratification of the Rome Statute, supra note 22 (now 120 since Cap Verde joined on 
Oct. 11, 2011). 
 25 The States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 23 (now thirty-three since Cap Verde 
joined on Oct. 11, 2011). 
 26 Id.  
 27 Id.  
 28 Id.  
 29 Id.; About the EU: Countries, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abouteu/countries/index_en. 
htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).  
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Arab countries who ratified the Rome treaty, for reasons that speak for 
themselves.  
So far, Tunisia has come out of this Arab Spring and has now rati-
fied the Rome Treaty. Others may follow and depending on developments 
in those countries they might become democracies. It is democratic nations 
more than others that accede to the Rome Treaty and are prepared to make 
themselves parties to international humanitarian law efforts.  
Then there is the use of the ICC by governments. It is a strange iro-
ny that African countries, three of them, have approached the ICC and said 
“please come and investigate what’s happening with regard to war crimes in 
our country.”30  
The first three cases before the ICC—from Uganda, from the Cen-
tral African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—came 
from governments.31 Again, nobody anticipated at all in 1998 or 2002 when 
the Court began, that cases would come before the Court from govern-
ments.32  
It was assumed that all the cases would be initiated by the prosecu-
tor using his own what are called proprio motu power, his power of refer-
ring cases for confirmation to a pretrial chamber of the International Crimi-
nal Court.33 
Three came from African Governments.34 Of the remaining three 
before the Court, two came, again to the amazement of the most optimistic 
supporters, from the Security Council.35 It had been assumed that the Secu-
rity Council for the then foreseeable decades would not refer cases to the 
  
 30 All Situations, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and 
+Cases/Situations/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (noting the first three ICC situation referrals of 
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2004 and the Central African Republic 
in January 2005). 
 31 Id. 
 32 See Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of ‘Self-Referrals’ a Sound Start for the ICC?, 2 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 949, 950–51 (2004) (describing the widespread backlash expected from 
countries pressed to self-refer cases to the ICC). 
 33 Id. at 951 (noting the significant difficulties expected with using the other jurisdictional 
triggers of Security Council referrals and complaints brought by an unconnected State Party 
to the Court). 
 34 All Situations, supra note 30.  
 35 Luigi Condorelli & Annalisa Ciampi, Comments on the Security Council Referral of the 
Situation in Darfur to the ICC, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 590, 590–91 (2005) (noting the 2005 
referral of Sudan regarding the Darfur crisis); Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Libyan 
Authorities in Bid to Stem Violent Repression, U.N. NEWS SERVICE (Feb. 26, 2011), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37633 [hereinafter Security Council Im-
poses Sanctions].  
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International Criminal Court because of the United States veto and the Rus-
sian veto and Chinese veto.36  
Powerful countries don’t like international courts. Powerful coun-
tries don’t like international adjudication at all. Powerful countries don’t 
like people from other nations looking over their shoulders and giving 
judgment on what they are doing.  
Two cases were referred by the Security Council and one during the 
second term of President George W. Bush. In his first term he went to ex-
treme lengths to try and kill this court in its infancy. At his urging, a com-
pliant Congress passed what then seemed and seems even more today to be 
ridiculous legislation, including what has been called the Hague Invasion 
Act, which authorizes American troops to rescue Americans who might be 
brought before the court in The Hague.37 It really stretches the imagination 
that the Congress of the United States could even consider, let alone pass, 
legislation of that nature. 
John Bolton famously stated that the happiest day of his career, was 
that during which he informed the Secretary General of the United Nations 
that the United States was withdrawing its signature from the Rome Trea-
ty.38 It was the same Administration in its second term that decided not to 
veto the reference of the Sudan of the Darfur situation to the International 
Criminal Court.39 One never knows and certainly the odds on that happen-
ing were thought to be just about zero.  
Two weeks before the United States announced it would not veto 
the referral, the then-Ambassador for War Crimes in the Bush Administra-
  
 36 See Johan D. van der Vyver, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, CASE W. 
RES. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW – FREDERICK K. COX INT’L LAW CTR. WAR CRIMES RESEARCH 
PORTAL (Sept. 23, 2003), http://law.case.edu/war-crimes-researchportal/instant_analysis. 
asp?id=5 (describing the obstacle a Permanent five veto poses to any Security Council refer-
ral). 
 37 American Service-Members’ Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–206, 116 Stat. 
820 (2002) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7401, § 2008) (granting the President “all 
means necessary and appropriate” to free any American serviceperson being tried before the 
Court); see also Diane F. Orentlicher, Unilateral Multilateralism: United States Policy To-
ward the International Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 415, 423 (2004) (noting the 
pejorative European reference to the act as the “Hague Invasion Act”). 
 38 Orentlicher, supra note 37, at 421 (noting that the Bush Administration rejected the 
Court due to its unbridled power); Robert C. Johansen, The Impact of US Policy toward the 
International Criminal Court on the Prevention of Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes 
Against Humanity, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 301, 301–02 (2006) (indicating that the un-signing was 
unsurprising to observers); van der Vyver, supra note 36 (presenting then-Undersecretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security’s opposition to the ICC). 
 39 Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security Council’s Referral of the Crimes in Darfur to the 
International Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to the Court: Implications for the 
International Criminal Court’s Function and Status, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 650, 650 (2006) 
(noting the U.S. decision to abstain from the vote rather than exercising its veto as expected).  
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tion, Pierre Richard Prosper said that the United States “will veto the refer-
ence because a reference by the Security Council will give the International 
Criminal Court credibility.”40 
He was right. It did give it credibility, but he was wrong that the 
U.S. would exercise its veto. And who would have believed that, as recently 
as this year, the United States would vote affirmatively for such a resolu-
tion. The Obama Administration voted affirmatively to refer the Libyan 
situation to the ICC, which is resulting, as we know, in the indictment of 
three Libyan leaders, including Gadhafi as well as one of his sons and his 
security chief.41 
So there is reason for optimism in a situation where pessimism had 
really overtaken the events and the prophecies that people were making with 
good rational reason.  
I might say in parentheses that I initially questioned the timing of 
the reference of the Libyan situation to the ICC. The Security Council for 
the first time used the so-called principle of the responsibility to protect 
because that is what it was doing by authorizing NATO powers to assist the 
rebels fighting against the regime of Muammar Gadhafi.42 The Security 
Council exercised its powers in order to protect civilian lives in Libya. The 
reference to the ICC seemed to me to be premature and might well have 
been postponed until the end of hostilities.  
I am happy that my concerns have proven to be ill founded. The 
fighting is coming to an end and so too is the Gadhafi regime.43 What will 
come in its place, we have to wait and see. If there is some form of demo-
cratic government, if decent operating courts of law can be set up, even one 
with international assistance, I certainly would strongly support a trial of 
Gadhafi in Libya, subject to his being able to be given a fair trial but by 
acceptable international standards, a big “if”.  
  
 40 See Johansen, supra note 38, at 321 (noting Ambassador Prosper’s explanation that 
“[w]e don’t want to be party to legitimizing the ICC”). 
 41 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya, 
Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, By Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 
Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 42 Libya: Implementation of UN Resolution 1973 for the Protection of Civilians; Urgent 
Action Required in Cote d’Ivoire; Deteriorating Situation in Abyei, INT’L COAL. 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ in-
dex.php/component/content/article/136-latest-news/3335-crisis-alert-libya-implementation-
of-un-resolution-1973-for-the-protection-of-civilians-urgent-action-required-in-cote-divoire-
deteriorating-situation-in-abyei (noting Resolution 1973 as the first implementation of mili-
tary action under the responsibility to protect doctrine). 
 43 Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Ends Mandate for NATO Operations in Libya, REUTERS (Oct. 
27, 2011), www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/27/us-libya-un-idUSTRE79P6EC20111027 
(indicating British Foreign Secretary William Hague’s optimistic sentiments for Libya’s 
future following the cessation of NATO operations). 
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I think that the Libyans have a long way to go in forming a gov-
ernment at all, let alone a democratic government, but if they can do that, 
then the complementarity on which the international court is based would 
favor a trial in Tripoli or somewhere in Libya rather than in The Hague.44 I 
am not optimistic that that will happen, and if it doesn’t, then, of course, the 
International Criminal Court must insist on the arrest warrant being carried 
out, and Gadhafi, if he is arrested, being tried in The Hague.  
There is also the possible resort to a mixed domestic and interna-
tional tribunal along the lines of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. That 
Court is regarded as having been a success and much credit for that must go 
to David Crane. On the other hand there is also the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon.45 The jury is still out but the prospects of accused persons appear-
ing before that tribunal appear to me to be highly unlikely. 
The intention, as I understand it, and it is possible under the statute 
under which that court operates, is that there will be a trial in absentia. I 
certainly don’t like trials in absentia. I believe they bring cold comfort to the 
victims, and from a prosecutor’s point of view, they are poison because if 
the accused person is ever brought to court, the trial in absentia is rendered 
void, and defense counsel have a wonderful opportunity of cross examining 
major witnesses who already have given evidence in the trial in absentia. 
Another problem, incidentally, with trials in absentia is, it makes important 
witnesses marked people for assassination, and that’s another huge danger 
of trials in absentia.46  
Let me move away from criminal justice and look at a couple of 
other areas of international law and decide whether they are in crisis. There 
is the International Court of Justice, the so-called World Court.47 When I 
was in The Hague in the middle 1990s, that court was almost ignored. I 
remember they had about two cases, one or two cases a year, and I remem-
ber my bemusement when I met with some of those judges of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, who complained that they were overworked. It was 
really Parkinson’s law: they worked harder on two cases than they would 
have on two hundred cases because they had nothing else to do. That has 
  
 44 Alison Cole, A Hybrid Court Could Secure Justice in Libya, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/oct/27/hybrid-court-justice-libya?newsfeed=true 
(indicating that while the principle of complementarity favors a trial in Libya, hybrid courts 
such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon are another alternative).  
 45 Id. 
 46 Cf. Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the 
Yugoslav Tribunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 217, 220 (2002) (noting the common 
usage of threats and other intimidation methods to dissuade witnesses from testifying in the 
Yugoslav war crimes trials). 
 47 See generally TERRY D. GILL & SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND 
HOW IT WORKS 23 (6th ed. 2003) (providing an excellent background resource on the func-
tion, structure, and work of the World Court).  
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changed considerably. The International Court of Justice presently has 
eighteen cases actively going on in front of its judges.48 Only governments 
can litigate in front of the International Court of Justice.49 No individuals, 
no organizations, only governments, and they can’t be forced to do so.50 
They go there willingly because they want to have their dispute settled by 
the International Court of Justice. So there has been a proliferation, relative-
ly speaking, of cases before the International Court of Justice, and these are 
brought by governments.  
The World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body is a good example 
of the huge increase in the use by governments of international law.51 Until 
sixteen years ago, trade disputes between members of the World Trade Or-
ganization were settled by quasi-diplomatic proceedings between govern-
ments.52 The system was directed not at litigating differences; the system 
was directed at finding solutions and frequently by way of compromise. It 
was usually diplomats who argued the cases in that court, not lawyers.  
Today the WTO dispute settlement system is really based on the 
rule of law.53 There are now binding outcomes and the final court of appeal 
is the Appellate Body of the WTO sitting in Geneva.54 By way of a foot-
note, the reason it is called the Appellate Body, I understand on good au-
thority, was to satisfy the United States and make it comfortable for the 
United States to join an appellate court that wasn’t called a court.55 So they 
called it the Appellate Body to make it palatable in Washington, D.C.  
That does not matter; it works. The present chairman of that court is 
an American, Jennifer Hillman.56 She has said, and I quote, from a yet un-
published piece: “the parlance of disputes has shifted from one of compro-
  
 48 Cases, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (listing 17 cases pending or under deliberation as of Nov. 3, 
2011).  
 49 GILL & ROSENNE, supra note 47, at 266 (referencing Article 34.1 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice declaring that only states may be parties before the Court).  
 50 Id. (referencing Article 36 of the Statute). 
 51 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body, TEX. INT’L L.J. 
469, 476 (2003) (noting that the Appellate Body of the WTO “has grown in size over the last 
years, in order to match the increasing caseload of the Appellate Body”).   
 52 John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the WTO - Emerging Problems, 1 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 329, 331–32, 338 (1998).  
 53 Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes – A Unique Contribution, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 
2012) (“The WTO’s Procedure underscore the rule of law, and it makes the trading system 
more secure and predictable.”).  
 54 Id. 
 55 Dispute Settlement – Appellate Body, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english 
/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012). 
 56 Id. 
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mise and settlement to one of winners and losers, victories and defeat. Many 
precedents have grown up in that court. They are persuasive rather than 
binding authority.”57 
It is interesting to see the countries that use that Appellate Body of 
the WTO, and we are talking about many billions of dollars involved in the 
cases that come before it. The major user has been the United States. It has 
initiated ninety-eight cases before the appellate body and has defended over 
a hundred.58 The European Union initiated eighty-five; defended seventy.59 
Canada initiated thirty-three; defended seventeen.60 They are followed by 
Brazil and India, Mexico, Argentina, Korea, Japan and Thailand, all those 
countries significant users of the appellate body of the WTO.61  
What appears to me as the most significant development is the use 
being made in recent years of the WTO Appellate Body by China: first, in 
defending cases, and now, more frequently, as an initiator of complaints 
before that body.62  
Finally, with regard to that body, what is also significant is that in 
the overwhelming number of cases it has heard, according to Jennifer Hill-
man, the WTO requirements have been found to have been substantially 
violated, and orders of compliance were issued by the appellate body.63 In 
  
 57 See Fabien Gelinas, Dispute Resolution as Institutionalization in International Trade 
and Information Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 492 (2005) (discussing the Appellate 
Body’s creators’ intent to preclude a case ruling from having binding precedential effect).  
 58 United States of America – Member Information, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto. 
org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/usa_e.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (listing 98 cases that 
the U.S. has initiated as complainant and 113 cases it has defended as respondent). 
 59 European Union – Member Information, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org 
/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) 
(listing 85 cases that the E.U. has initiated as complainant and 70 cases it has defended as 
respondent). 
 60 Canada – Member Information, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/the 
wto_e/countries_e/canada_e.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (listing 33 cases that Canada has 
initiated as complainant and 17 cases it has defended as respondent). 
 61 Understanding the WTO: The Organization – Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 
2012) (follow hyperlink of the desired country for information on the number of complaints 
initiated and defended by the country).  
 62 WTO Disputes Overtake 300 Mark, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 11, 2003), http://www. 
wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr353_e.htm (listing one case China had initiated as com-
plainant and no cases it had defended as of Sept. 11, 2003); China – Member Information, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2012) (listing eight cases China has initiated as complainant and 23 cases it 
has defended as respondent). 
 63 See Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 397, 398 (2007) (“Of the 109 adopt-
ed panel or panel/Appellate Body reports, in nearly 90% of these cases the panel and/or the 
Appellate Body have found WTO violations.”). 
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almost every case, the United States, China, India, you name them; the 
countries have carried out the orders and the decisions of the appellate body 
of the WTO. 
Turning to the European Court of Human Rights; it has a backlog, 
apparently, of well over one hundred thousand cases and the number con-
tinues to grow, many of them coming from Russia who submitted to the 
jurisdiction of that court.64  
So one sees in these areas—and there are others—that there is an 
increasing reliance on international law. So, far from being in crisis, it is 
being used more and more and being called in aid more and more. I now 
turn to the area where I would suggest there is crisis, and that is in the abil-
ity of most of those courts to satisfy the calls that are being made on them.  
Let me go through the ones I have referred to. I needn’t refer to the 
WTO because one sees there that it is being used, and it is coping well.  
What about the criminal courts? The ad hoc tribunals are winding 
down.65 The Sierra Leone tribunal is winding down.66 The Cambodia tribu-
nal hasn’t got too much life left in it.67 The steam has already gone,68 and as 
David Crane indicated last night, in a very few years from now the only 
international criminal court will be the permanent ICC.69 
And David with every good reason was bemoaning the fact that that 
court is the one court in respect of which the United States influence has 
diminished. I suggest though not to the point of extinction. I think the Unit-
ed States will always play a crucial role in that court, even if it doesn’t ratify 
  
 64 See Mammoth Backlog Prompts European Rights Court Reforms, BBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8525524.stm (citing a backlog of 120,000 cases at 
the European Court of Human Rights, 27,000 of which originated in Russia). 
 65 See Guido Acquaviva, Was a Residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals 
Really Necessary?, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 789, 795 (2011) (describing the U.N.’s creation of 
an International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, which will result in the ICTR 
beginning to wind down in July 2012 and the ICTY beginning to wind down in July 2013). 
 66 See Juliette Rousselot, 13 Years of International Justice, HUMAN RTS. NOW BLOG (July 
17, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/justice/13-years-of-the-international-
criminal-court/#more-22476 (“[T]rials are winding down at the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, which is expected to render a verdict in the Charles Taylor case in the next few 
months . . . .”). 
 67 See Mike Eckel, Cambodia Genocide Tribunal May End Prosecutions Prematurely, 
WASH. TIMES (May 4, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/4/cambodia-
genocide-tribunal-may-end-prosecutions-pr/ (“Human Rights Watch expressed concern 
Wednesday that the tribunal will shut down its operations after the current case and abandon 
plans for trials of other former Khmer Rouge officials.”).  
 68 See supra notes 65–67 (discussing the winding down of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia).  
 69 See David Crane, An Age of Extremes: International Law in Crisis: Eight Challenges, 
44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 47, 52–53 (2012). 
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the Rome Treaty. The United States will continue to play a role because of 
the activities of civil society in this country. Many of the people responsible 
for those activities are sitting in this room, and you know who you are. 
Without you and without your efforts, international criminal justice 
wouldn’t have notched up the successes that it has over the last seventeen, 
eighteen years.  
But the ICC is facing crises. It is facing crises, mainly of percep-
tion, but again, as I think David Crane indicated, perceptions are a fact. It is 
not just a theory. What people perceive is a fact. Their perceptions may be 
right. Their perceptions may be wrong. But they have to be taken into ac-
count.  
The perception in Africa is that the International Criminal Court is 
anti-African, and was set up by Western countries to investigate Africans.70 
Of course, that perception exists and is being nurtured by politicians, and 
sometimes I will suggest by dishonest politicians because it is completely 
unfair for the reasons I have mentioned. One of the six cases before the In-
ternational Criminal Court has been referred by the prosecutor; the other 
five, as I indicated, three by governments, two by the Security Council.71 
The court didn’t choose those situations. The court was chosen to look into 
those situations.  
That perception is going to remain until, I hope, in the coming few 
years the International Criminal Court is going to become seized of situa-
tions that don’t only relate to sub-Saharan Africa. So that’s the one problem 
of perception.  
The second problem, of course, is the number of governments that 
have failed to honor their international legal obligations. No international 
laws can be of any utility, can be of any force, unless there is the political 
will of governments that are parties to them, to carry them out and adhere to 
them.  
This is the greatest problem and weakness of international law. No 
international court, no international body has or in any of our lifetimes, will 
ever have its own police force or own army to execute its judgments.72 It is 
  
 70 See ALEXIS ARIEFF ET AL., CONG. RES. SERVICE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
CASES IN AFRICA: STATUS AND POLICY ISSUES 26 (2011), available at http://assets.opencrs. 
com/rpts/RL34665_20110307.pdf (“The ICC’s investigations in Africa have stirred concerns 
over African sovereignty, in part due to the long history of foreign intervention on the conti-
nent.”).  
 71 Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC 
/Situations+and+Cases/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2012). 
 72 See, e.g., Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court as a Legal Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 24 
(2003) (“[T]he ICC’s success will largely depend on international cooperation, especially 
insofar as the Court commands no police force of its own.”). 
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now and will remain completely dependent on the support and cooperation 
from national governments.  
That’s a fact of life, and I read some years ago, somebody, and I 
have forgotten who it was, said: “if there is a problem with no solution, it is 
not a problem. It is a fact, and you have to deal with it.”73 
[Laughter.] 
And the fact of international law is that it depends and will always 
depend on the cooperation of national governments, and that’s not a prob-
lem; it is a fact, and it has to be dealt with. And, of course, that’s the im-
portance of the United States certainly until now.  
David knows, I know, all chief prosecutors know—past and pre-
sent—that the United States played the crucial role in making these courts 
work. The ad hoc tribunals wouldn’t have been set up without the United 
States’ support, and it was mainly Madeline Albright who was responsible 
for it.74  
Having been set up, they wouldn’t have succeeded. We wouldn’t 
have gotten intelligence information. We wouldn’t have had sufficient staff-
ing. We wouldn’t have had sufficient money, but most important of all the 
courts wouldn’t have gotten their major culprits before them without the 
political and economic power of the United States and its willingness to 
force governments to cooperate with the Court.  
Milošević wouldn’t have been there. Karadžić wouldn’t have been 
there now. Mladić wouldn’t be there now. The leading generals, Gotovina75 
and the others who came to the international court, the Rwanda tribunal 
succeeding, none of those things would have happened. I know from my 
own experience none of those things would have happened without active 
support from Washington, D.C. 
So it is a problem that the international court has. It hasn’t been as 
fortunate as these other courts were, but that seems to be changing, and that 
  
 73 James Joyner, NATO: Problems with No Solutions?, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 28, 
2010), http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/nato-problems-no-solutions (“But, as Shimon 
Peres noted and Donald Rumsfeld popularized, ‘If a problem has no solution, it may not be a 
problem, but a fact, not to be solved, but to be coped with over time.’”). 
 74 See MADELEINE ALBRIGHT & BILL WOODWARD, MADAM SECRETARY 183 (2003) (“[T]he 
Clinton administration, the leading financial contributor [to the ICTY], didn’t waver . . . . We 
made cooperation with the tribunal a top issue in all our bilateral relationships with govern-
ments both in and outside the region.”); VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA 
AND THE BALKANS: VIRTUAL TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 159 (2008) 
(“Moreover, some Western diplomats, particularly in the U.S. State Department, viewed the 
[ICTR] as key to ensuring peace and stability in Rwanda and elsewhere in Central Africa.”). 
 75 See Marlise Simons, U.N. Court Convicts Two Croatian Generals of War Crimes and 
Frees a Third, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2011, at A9 (describing the crimes and trial of General 
Gotovina). 
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support can be forthcoming from Washington even if the United States does 
not join as an active party.  
Of course, those of us who support the International Criminal Court 
would rejoice if the United States would ratify the Rome Treaty, and that’s 
the big question out there, and that is whether the court will succeed in the 
coming decade and more. I have no doubt that eventually the United States 
will ratify the Rome Statute.  
And I say that because the people of this country don’t approve of 
war criminals. The people of this country don’t want war criminals to have 
impunity, and if the United States government and the United States Presi-
dent and the Senate come to the conclusion that it is in the interests of the 
United States to join, they will do it.  
They are not going to do that unless they are convinced that it is in-
deed in the interests of the United States and understandably so. No legisla-
ture, no president, no head of state, no parliament is going to take a step that 
they believe is not in the interests of the country that they lead and repre-
sent. 
Let me draw this to a conclusion by referring to a recent book some 
of us, I am sure some of you have read, Joseph Nye’s book called “The Fu-
ture of Power.”76 He convincingly distinguishes on the one hand between 
the transition of power between states, and on the other of the transition of 
power between Asian and Western states and particularly the rise of China 
and India.77 
That’s the transition of power and the fear by many in this country, 
and other Western countries, that the United States’ preeminence is on a 
downward curve, and China and India are on an upward curve, a topic we 
are not going to discuss today. He contrasts this transition of power with the 
diffusion of power from governments to non-state actors and in particular, 
non-governmental organizations.78  
This diffusion has been facilitated by the side of the world in which 
we are living, and we see many examples of it right now: the tent cities in 
Israeli cities; the Arab Spring; none of these things would have been con-
ceivable without cyber power; the riots in London and so forth.79  
  
 76 See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE FUTURE OF POWER (2011) (examining the changes 
and development of governmental power since the Cold War to project how power will 
evolve in the future). 
 77 Id. at 177–86 (describing China’s rise in power); id. at 173–75 (describing India’s rise 
in power).  
 78 Id. at 119 (“The real issue related to the diffusion of power is not the continued exist-
ence of the state, but how it functions . . . . In a world of global interdependence, the agenda 
of international politics is broader, and everyone seems to get into the act.”). 
 79 See Brett Van Niekirk et al., Analyzing the Role of ICTs in the Tunisian and Egyptian 
Unrest from an Information Warfare Perspective, 5 INT’L J. COMM. 1406, 1407–08 (2011), 
available at http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/1168/614 (discussing various 
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As Nye put it: “in a world where borders are becoming more porous 
than ever before, to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terror-
ism nations must mobilize international coalitions and build institutions to 
address shared threats and challenges.”80  
A current illustration of the relevance of NGOs relates to the CICC, 
the Coalition for the International Criminal Court. It is an amazing organi-
zation, the largest non-governmental organization I guess in the world.81 It 
is a coalition of over two and a half thousand NGOs from over 120 coun-
tries and it is brilliantly led by an American, William Pace, out of his office 
in New York.82 
There has been concern about the qualifications of some of the 
judges who have been appointed to the International Criminal Court over 
the last decade. With the full consent of the leaders of the Assembly of 
States Parties, the CICC set up a panel of five individuals, with no interna-
tional powers at all.83 It is an NGO.84 It is the Independent Panel on the 
Election of Candidates to the ICC.85 It has already begun its work. There is 
presently the process to elect six new judges to the Court. The election will 
be held during December of this year. I was appointed to chair the Commit-
tee. Judge Pat Wald of Washington D.C. is vice chairing it.86 Hans Corell, 
the former Undersecretary General for Legal Affairs from Sweden, is on 
it.87 Judge O-Gon Kwon from the Yugoslavia tribunal is on it,88 and Cecelia 
Medina from Argentina, a leading Latin American judge and lawyer, is the 
  
social activist movements that have employed information and communications technology 
(ICT) to pursue their goals).  
 80 Joseph Nye, Joe Nye Answers Your Questions on the Future of American Power, CNN 
WORLD (Mar. 15, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/15/joseph-nye-
answers-your-questions-on-the-future-of-american-power/.  
 81 About the Coalition, COAL. INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=coalition 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (“The Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) in-
cludes 2,500 civil society organizations in 150 different countries working in                   
partnership . . . .”). 
 82 Id. (describing CICC membership statistics); CICC Convenor and Staff, COAL. INT’L 
CRIM. COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=convenorstaff (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (“Mr. 
William R. Pace has served as the Convenor of the Coalition for an International Criminal 
Court since its founding in 1995.”). 
 83 About, INDEP. PANEL ON ICC JUD. ELECTIONS, http://www.iccindependentpanel.org/ 
about (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (summarizing the creation of the Panel, its mandate and its 
membership). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 About, supra note 83. 
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fifth member.89 What is our brief? We are to have regard to all the docu-
mentation that comes to the Assembly of States parties and relevant gov-
ernments. Relying solely on the relevant provisions of the Rome Treaty, 
which sets out the qualifications of judges,90 we will issue a public report 
prior to the election stating whether the candidates are qualified or not qual-
ified. If we hold any candidate to be “unqualified” we will furnish reasons 
for that opinion. 
The hope is that this should act as a deterrent against governments 
putting forward candidates who are likely to be held to be unqualified. 
However, the point I want to make is: who would have thought five years 
ago that governments represented in the Assembly of States parties, now 
119 countries,91 would welcome an NGO doing this work?  
It is really a good example, I think, of what Joseph Nye calls the 
diffusion of power to NGO’s.92 Of course, this diffusion carries its danger. 
Al Qaeda is also the result of this sort of diffusion. So diffusion from gov-
ernments to non-governmental organizations can be for good, and it can be 
for evil. So again, it is a phenomenon that one must watch. 
Finally, I was impressed with the last panel before the luncheon ad-
journment on global warming.93 I went to that panel because I know so little 
about it. I thought it was a good opportunity to learn something, and it 
seemed to me that there is an area of international law that is in crisis be-
cause insufficient has been done about it. More law is needed, and more 
political will is needed in order to comply with the tremendous needs that 
were so articulately and very clearly pointed out by that panel.  
So I hope I have said sufficient to demonstrate that far from being 
in crisis international law continues to be an essential tool; international 
courts using international law are being called upon more frequently to help 
resolve some of the most difficult and important problems facing our global 
community.  
Thank you very much. 
[Applause.] 
  
 89 Id. 
 90 Id.; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 36, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) (outlining the qualification, nominations and election of 
judges). 
 91 The States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 23 (now 120 countries since Cap 
Verde joined in Oct. 2011). 
 92 See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph D. Nye, Jr., Introduction, in GOVERNANCE IN A 
GLOBALIZING WORLD 22 (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue eds., 2000).  
 93 See International Law in Crisis, CASE W. RES. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW – FREDERICK K. COX 
INT’L LAW CTR., http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/content.asp?content_id=191 (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2012); see also International Law in Crisis – Panel 2B, YOUTUBE (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYdpmyhsEFQ 
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PROFESSOR SCHARF:  Thank you very much for those insightful 
remarks. We will now have fifteen minutes of questions. Just come up to the 
microphones and line up behind each other. Please identify where you are 
from and your name and then ask the question.  
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  My name is Kevin Hartman. I am a stu-
dent here at Case.  
I was just going to ask you, the Security Council has referred al-
Bashir to the ICC, and consistently, he has traveled to other African states 
without being taken to the ICC. And I was wondering, is there any law 
around holding the leaders for harboring him to the ICC from justice and 
what can be done about this in the future?  
HON. RICHARD GOLDSTONE:  Well, of course, this is perhaps 
one of the most vivid examples of some of the problems that are being faced 
by International Criminal Court and its reliance on government. It is dis-
graceful that at least one government, which is a party to the Rome Treaty, 
allowing President al-Bashir under an arrest warrant to come into the coun-
try and not to arrest him.94 But that’s the exception.  
As a South African, I am proud that our government indicated to 
President al-Bashir that he was the only African leader not being invited to 
the inauguration of our President Jacob Zuma.95 The ambassador from the 
Sudan was called in and was told that his president is not being invited be-
cause we would be obliged to arrest him and hand him over for trial in The 
Hague.96 In another situation, the government of Botswana made a similar 
declaration,97 and at least one other government, Kenya, canceled a visit 
from al-Bashir after they were pressured to do so.98  
But this is the problem, and it is not the first time it arose. The arrest 
warrant against al-Bashir has rendered it very difficult for him to be a head 
of state. Heads of state have a problem if they can’t travel freely, and he 
can’t travel freely.  
  
 94 See Chad Refuses to Arrest Sudan’s Al-Bashir, CBC NEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/news/ 
world/story/2010/07/21/chad-sudan-bashir.html (last updated July 21, 2010) (reporting on 
Chad being the first ICC member state to not arrest Al-Bashir); Kenya’s ICJ Moves to Court 
to Seek Bashir’s Arrest, E. AFRICAN (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-
/2558/1056094/-/om9rrez/-/index.html (noting that the Kenyan Government failed to arrest 
Al’ Bashir when he visited in August 2010); Omar Al-Bashir Arrest Requested Rejected by 
Malawi, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
15308198 (quoting the Prime Minster to the effect that it was not Malawi’s “business” to 
arrest Al-Bashir). 
 95 Bashir Will Not Be Invited to Zuma’s Inauguration, ICC OBSERVERS (Apr. 26, 2009), 
http://icc-observers.org/2009/04/26/bashir-will-not-be-invited-to-zumas-inauguration/. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Botswana Stands by the International Criminal Court, REPUBLIC BOTSWANA (July 28, 
2010), http://www.gov.bw/en/News/Botswana-stands-by-the-International-Criminal-Court-/. 
 98 Kenya’s ICJ Moves to Court to Seek Bashir’s Arrest, supra note 94. 
File: Goldstone 2 Created on:  4/3/2012 1:08:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:27:00 PM 
32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:13 
That is obviously a way in which he is being largely marginalized. 
There is no European nation that he can visit. He can’t attend a meeting in 
the United States or Canada. The former was a party to the Security Council 
resolution and the latter has ratified the Rome Treaty.99 No doubt the United 
States would wish to see al-Bashir brought to trial.  
So this is a mixed report, but more and more countries that ignore 
their international obligations are going to be castigated. They are going to 
be isolated because if countries refuse to carry out their international obliga-
tions in that area, they are going to be distrusted. Governments who don’t 
carry out their obligation are going to be suspect.  
And people will start worrying about doing trade with them because 
if they break their word in that respect, they will break their word in the 
other respect. More frequently governments have to comply with interna-
tional law if they want to have credibility. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Thank you. 
HON. RICHARD GOLDSTONE:  But to answer your question di-
rectly, there is nothing that can be done against the leaders of those coun-
tries because it is not criminal not to carry out your obligation.100 It is a 
breach of the international treaty, but it is not a criminal offense.101 
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  My name is Nick Weiss. I am a second 
year law student here at Case, and you talked about this briefly, but the ICC 
has indicted Gadhafi, and the transitional government has also said that it 
would like to prosecute. Which of these two courts do you think should 
prosecutor Gadhafi?  
HON. RICHARD GOLDSTONE:  Well, I think I did refer to that 
briefly in my opening remarks. The International Criminal Court in The 
Hague, the permanent court, is referred to as a court of second choice.102 
The court that has the first right to investigate and prosecute and punish war 
criminals is the court of the country from where that person comes, not the 
International Criminal Court.103 It is really a reverse of the situation that 
existed with the United Nations tribunals who had first choice.104 
  
 99 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Su-
dan, To Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 3, 
2005) (although the Resolution was adopted, the U.S. abstained from voting). 
100 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Treaties as Binding International Obligations, AM. SOC. INT’L L. 
(May 1997), http://www.asil.org/insight9.cfm (noting treaties do not legally bind parties). 
101 Id. 
102 ICC at a Glance, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+ 
Court/ICC+at+a+glance/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2012); see also Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, supra note 90, art. 17 (outlining issues of admissibility).  
103 ICC at a Glance, supra note 102. 
104 See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of 
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 385 (1998) 
(describing International Tribunals as having primacy over national courts). 
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The International Criminal Court may not get involved in any crim-
inal case if a country whose courts have jurisdiction wish to do so them-
selves.105 
Take an example: If a soldier from the United Kingdom was to be 
charged with war crimes committed in Afghanistan or Iraq, the United 
Kingdom could say to the International Criminal Court “we will investi-
gate.” If the United Kingdom does that and investigates in good faith, then 
regardless of the outcome, the International Criminal Court would have no 
jurisdiction.106  
And there is no reason in my view why that shouldn’t—in theory—
apply in Libya. The question is: it can only happen if the local court, if the 
domestic court is willing and able to hold a fair trial under international 
standards. 
If and when Libya will have a court that can hold an open and fair 
trial by international standards, your guess is as good as mine. If that does 
not happen within a short time, it seems to me that the international court is 
the only court with effective jurisdiction.  
If I was in the position of the chief prosecutor or the judges of that 
court, I would insist on the international court proceeding against Gadhafi 
unless and until a Libyan court, if necessary, with assistance from other 
countries in the international community is able to put on the trial. 
And let me say, I favor the principle of complementarity not only 
because that’s what the Rome Statute provides but it is also first prize in any 
justice system that trials should take place at or as close to the scene of the 
crimes as possible. That’s where the victims are.  
If a criminal justice system is to have credibility, it should function 
at home. One of the problems for the Yugoslavian tribunal and the Rwanda 
tribunal has been that the trials took place many thousands of miles away 
from where the crimes were committed.  
There is often no alternative. If there is an alternative, it should be 
preferred. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Thank you. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Thank you. My name is Jessica Feil. I am 
a student here at Case. You mentioned it briefly in your speech, but I was 
wondering if you thought the criticisms of the international court being too 
focused on Africa? Could you expand a bit on whether or not you think it is 
a legitimate criticism?  
  
105 ICC at a Glance, supra note 102; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, supra note 90, art. 17.  
106 See Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ 
ICC/About+the+Court/Frequently+asked+Questions/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (explaining 
that “complementarity” prevents ICC jurisdiction unless the country is unwilling or genuine-
ly unable to investigate the alleged crime). 
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HON. RICHARD GOLDSTONE:  Well, as I have said, I think it is 
a very unfair criticism for the reasons I mentioned, and that is the African 
governments can hardly complain if they themselves are responsible. I un-
derstand the perception, the perception of the African Union, of a number of 
states.  
It is peculiar that you have an International Criminal Court mainly 
supported by Northern and Western countries and the only cases before the 
court happen to be African. This looks like, to many people, a sort of neoco-
lonial Western imperialistic decision to go against African countries.  
And let me say what exacerbates it: It is the failure to go against 
powerful countries. War crimes we know have been committed ad nauseam 
by Russia, by China, by other Asian countries.107 They are not before the 
International Criminal Court. They are not there because they are not pre-
pared to join in. They are not prepared to ratify their own treaty.108 And they 
have got vetoes in the Security Council.109 
So one has to be a little bit sympathetic to the African perception. I 
think it is unfair, and as I say, it is going to continue to exist until non-
African countries come before International Criminal Court. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Thank you. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  I am Claude Welch from the University 
of Buffalo. I wondered if you could speak to the possibility that appointing 
an African prosecutor might help to reduce the concerns that are expressed, 
the critiques you just spoke of both in your remarks and in response to the 
last question.  
HON. RICHARD GOLDSTONE:  Well, you know, the present 
prosecutor’s term of office ends in the middle of next year, and there is al-
ready a search committee being set up by the Assembly of States parties to 
look for a new prosecutor.110 And there is a lot of talk out there, newspaper 
  
107 See generally Wenqi Zhu & Binxin Zhang, Expectation of Prosecuting the Crimes of 
Genocide in China, in CONFRONTING GENOCIDE 173, 174 (René Provost & Payam Akhavan 
eds., 2011) (explaining that China lags behind the international effort to prosecute for inter-
national crimes); Christopher W. Mullins, War Crimes in the 2008 Georgia – Russia Con-
flict, 51 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 918 (2011) (addressing the war crimes committed by both 
Georgia and Russia). 
108 See Valeriane Toon, International Criminal Court: Reservations of Non-State Parties in 
Southeast Asia, 26 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 218, 219 (2004) (noting the uneasiness of Russia, 
China, and the United States over the ICC). 
109 Id.; see also U.N. Security Council: Membership in 2012, http://www.un.org/sc 
/members.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (noting the voting process, and veto power of cur-
rent members in the Security Council). 
110 See CICC Elections Team Questions and Answers on the ICC Prosecutor Election, 
COAL. INT’L CRIM. COURT (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICC 
_Elections_Team__QandA_ICC_Prosecutor_Election_150911-1.pdf (describing the process 
of electing the Prosecutor for the ICC in 2011). 
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articles, rumor, that for the reason you mentioned there should be an Afri-
can prosecutor. 
And one of the front runners is the present Deputy Chief Prosecu-
tor, Fatou Bensouda, who is a black African.111 I have a problem with the 
theory that the prosecutor should come from a particular continent, but hav-
ing said that, as an African, if an African is, all things being equal, the best 
person to be the chief prosecutor, great.  
That’s a matter for celebration, but I certainly would be against the 
appointment of somebody simply because of the country they come from or 
the color of their skin. I think the most appropriate, the best qualified per-
son, should be appointed. And if that person happens to come from an Asian 
country, so be it.  
I certainly would be strongly against appointing somebody simply 
because they come from a particular continent where there are other candi-
dates with better qualifications. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Thank you very much. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Hi. My name is Danielle Fritz, and I am a 
law student here at Case. A few months ago the U.K. foreign minister sug-
gested that it might be a good idea to negotiate in exile for a peace deal with 
Gadhafi.112  
Are these agreements ever in the interest of international peace? 
HON. RICHARD GOLDSTONE:  You know, one must distin-
guish—it is a great question—one must distinguish between political deci-
sions being made with regard to international justice and courts on the one 
hand and legal decisions on the other.  
In my view and it is something that David Crane and I have often 
debated and not always agreed on. In my view, the prosecutor and judges 
should take legal decisions. They have been appointed not to be politicians, 
and if they were, they would make the lousiest politicians in the world. I 
have no doubt about that.  
[Laughter.] 
HON. RICHARD GOLDSTONE:  They may even not be the great-
est lawyers, but they would be the worst politicians. It is not their calling.  
  
111 Mark Kersten, The ICC’s Next Top Prosecutor: The Candidates, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT 
(June 3, 2011), http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/06/03/the-iccs-next-top-prosecutor-the-
candidates/ (giving a brief bio of each of the candidates for ICC Prosecutor). 
112 Bridget Kendal, Could Gaddafi Go into ‘Internal Exile’ in Libya, BBC NEWS (July 26, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14298472 (reporting on the possibility of peace deal 
with Qaddafi). But see Mary Beth Sheridan, Moammar Gaddafi Killed in Rebel Custody as 
Last Loyalist Holdout in Libya Falls, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.washington 
post.com/world/gaddafis-home-town-overrun-conflicting-reports-on-his-fate/2011/10/20 
/gIQAMwTB0L_story.html (announcing Gadhafi was shot to death by rebel fighters who 
seized him from a drainage pipe). 
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Secondly, they are not parties to any peace negotiations. They don’t 
know what’s going on. I agree with David that prosecutors should not have 
their heads in the cloud and should be aware of the effect of what they do. 
In the case of Gadhafi, I have no doubt the court’s job is to get him on trial 
for terrible crimes he has committed in the very recent past. 
If it can be established—and it is a very big “if”—that peace would 
come to Libya if Gadhafi was given asylum in some lovely haven like Zim-
babwe, that would be a question to be determined by politicians, not by 
lawyers, and the politicians who would have to decide that would be those 
on the Security Council.  
The Rome Treaty setting up the International Criminal Court pro-
vides that the Security Council can order proceedings in that court to be 
suspended for successive periods of one year.113 If there was rational evi-
dence that could persuade the necessary majority of the Security Council 
with no veto cast by one of the Permanent Members that it is in the interest 
of the people of Libya that Gadhafi should not be prosecuted, that would be 
a political decision.  
And frankly, I wouldn’t lose any sleep if they took that decision, 
but it is not a decision I believe should be taken in The Hague. The prosecu-
tor has no power to make it anyway, I am happy to say, and the judges may 
or may not have the authority to take such a decision but they certainly 
wouldn’t do it if the prosecutor didn’t request them to do so.  
So I think there are very few cases where giving effective amnesty 
or asylum to the worst war criminal, is going to bring any enduring peace, 
and certainly, it has been the experience in the last seventeen years, since 
there have been international criminal courts, that justice and prosecution 
have assisted the peace rather than the converse. 
PROFESSOR SCHARF:  Last question. Ruth. 
PROFESSOR RUTH WEDGWOOD:  Well, I certainly agree with 
you that Ocampo, I think, has done a very prudent job in steering the court 
and giving it sea legs.114 Three quick, each hard questions, though, none 
probably admitting yes or no answers.  
  
113 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 90, art. 16 (outlining the 
deferral of investigation or prosecution). 
114 See Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/ 
structure+of+the+court/office+of+the+prosecutor/biographies/the+prosecutor.htm (last visit-
ed Jan. 19, 2012) (becoming the first ICC Prosecutor when he was unanimously elected on 
April 21, 2003); see also Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2012) (listing fifteen cases 
arising out of seven situations that have been brought before the ICC by the Prosecutor); The 
Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens its First Investigation, 
INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20 
releases/2004/the%20office%20of%20the%20prosecutor%20of%20the%20international% 
20criminal%20court%20opens%20its%20first%20investigation?lan=en-GB (last visited Jan. 
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Just forgive me for raising this, but I take the performance of the ad 
hoc tribunal as a very important precedent for the performance of the ICC 
because they really were the test runs, if you will, and I mentioned this 
morning the fact that ICTR, the Rwanda tribunal, never did try any Tutsi 
cases gives pause to people who suppose the courts can take purely a politi-
cal stance. 
Second, this is a lawyer’s question: On complementarity, you are 
supposed to be unwilling or unable to handle that case yourself; not that you 
would rather not.115 So I am wondering what you think. I am wondering is 
some defense lawyer going to have an argument that “rather not” is not a 
satisfaction of complementarity, would be objectively unwilling or unable 
but not to be preferred and push it off for political reasons perhaps because 
it is easier to have The Hague decide it than…  
HON. RICHARD GOLDSTONE:  Well, Uganda is a good          
example. 
PROFESSOR RUTH WEDGWOOD:  And final one, answer as 
you see fit. I am straying a little bit here, but shouldn’t perhaps the principle 
of complementarity also apply to political bodies? For example, the Human 
Rights Council is now deciding whether to take up Sri Lanka,116 and they 
may or may not have done an adequate job, but shouldn’t national states 
first be given the prerogative of investigating their own war crimes before 
or in the future political bodies take the sort of quasi-investigative role?  
HON. RICHARD GOLDSTONE:  Well, thanks. But those two 
questions would really require more than a few minutes for response. So let 
me give a telegraphic response to both. 
On the Rwanda situation, just by way of explanation, the issue is 
that there is critical evidence that emerged over the years that the army of 
Kagame, the present president of Rwanda117 and the military genius who put 
an end to the genocide committed very serious war crimes involving many 
thousands of victims.118  
  
19, 2012) (announcing Ocampo’s first investigation will be the alleged crimes committed on 
the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo).  
115 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 90, art. 17 (structuring 
the court as a court of last resort). 
116 See Iqbal Athas, Sri Lanka State of Emergency to end September 14, CNN (Aug. 25, 
2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-25/world/sri.lanka.end.emergency_1_tamil-tiger-reb 
els-president-rajapaksa-foreign-minister-lakshman-kadirgamar?_s=PM:WORLD (reporting 
on President Rajapaksa’s decision not to sign a proclamation renewing the state of emergen-
cy).  
117 Personal Profile, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, http://www.presidency.gov.rw/presidents-
profile (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (noting that the Rwandan, Paul Kagame, took office Apr. 
22, 2000).  
118 See Lars Waldorf, “A Mere Pretense of Justice”: Complementarity, Sham Trials, and 
Victor’s Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1221, 1225 (describing the 
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And I can speak about it openly because this is an issue that didn’t 
emerge during my watch, I am happy to say, that but arose during the watch 
of people who succeeded me as chief prosecutor of that tribunal.  
By any standards, the violations committed by the RPF Army of 
Kagame should have been investigated. They fell within the jurisdiction of 
the court.119 The prosecutors didn’t do it—there can be no question—
because they were aware, and it was said publicly by the government of 
Rwanda, “Prosecutor: If you investigate crimes committed by our Army, 
that’s the end of our cooperation with you. We will break off all coopera-
tion,”120 and that would have been the end of the tribunal.  
The witnesses had to come from Rwanda. So a prosecutor is faced 
with a terrible choice. Do I do the honorable thing and prosecute across the 
board, or do I ignore these revenge attacks?  
Let me make that clear that the attacks made by the RPF Army were 
of a very different caliber to the genocide committed by the previous gov-
ernment of Rwanda; eight hundred thousand people killed in a genocide 
over less than a hundred days.121 These were revenge attacks by the Army 
of the victims.122 
And the prosecutors, I believe, unfortunately, simply swept this un-
der the rug. They didn’t deal with it. They just didn’t investigate, and the 
tribunal was able to continue to its conclusion.123 I think what I would have 
done—and I am speaking with hindsight—and I don’t say it in any criticism 
of them at all, I think they were in a very difficult position. What I think 
should have been said is: our job, we were set up to investigate the geno-
cide, eight hundred thousand people. We weren’t set up to investigate re-
venge attacks. We could investigate them, but I am not going to jeopardize 
the major purpose of this tribunal, which is the genocide and the future of 
the people of Rwanda. I am not going to jeopardize this by being holier than 
thou and going against people who didn’t commit genocide.  
  
ICTR prosecutor’s decision to allow Rwandan investigation of Kagame’s army’s alleged war 
crimes).  
119 CTR: Rwanda Tribunal Creates Rich Legal Precedent, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 15, 
2010), http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/01/15-3 (“The Rwanda tribunal's 
prosecutor failed to bring charges against members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front.”). 
120 See Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War 
Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT’L ORG. 655, 665–71 (2001) (describing the shortcomings of the 
ICTR, including reasons the Rwandan government refused to cooperate with the tribunal).  
121 Ingvar Carlsson, The UN Inadequacies, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 837, 841 (2005). 
122 See GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 306 (1994). 
123 See generally JENNIFER TRAHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (2010) (full summary of the jurisprudence of the ICTR).  
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I think, incidentally, the Yugoslavia tribunal was faced with a simi-
lar decision when Russia complained about NATO crimes in the bombing 
of Kosovo.124 I think on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 as the most serious, the 
Yugoslavia tribunal and the Rwanda tribunal were investigating genocide of 
9’s and 10’s. I think the revenge attacks maybe were at 4, 5, and 6’s. The 
NATO crimes were at 1’s and 2’s. They were not committed with intent. 
That there might have been negligence is another matter.  
So I think I would have advised a pragmatic solution, and I would 
have had to live with it. 
PROFESSOR SCHARF:  And you will have to answer parts 2 and 
3 afterwards, but everybody, please, again, join me in applause. 
[Applause.]    
 
  
124 Russian Duma Condemns NATO, BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/europe /305762.stm.  
